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CITIZEN POLICE: USING THE QUI TAM PROVISION OF THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO PROMOTE RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN HOUSING
Jan P. Mensz*
Economic and racialintegration in housing remains elusive more than forty years
after the passage of the Fair Housing Act. Recalcitrant municipal governments
and exclusionary zoning ordinances have played a large role in maintainingand
exacerbatingsegregated housing patterns. After discussing some of the persistent
causes of segregated housingpatterns, this Note presents a novel approach to enforcing the Fair Housing Act and the "affirmatively furtheringfair housing"
requirement on recipients offederal housing grants. This Note presents a citizen
suit that emerged from the Southern District of New York in Anti-Discrimination
Center v. Westchester County, where a private plaintiff successfully used the
False Claims Act to enforce the Westchester County's obligations to overcome impediments to racial integration. This Note concludes by arguing for specific
reforms, regional coordination, and inclusionaryzoning policies that recipients of
ftderalfunds should adopt as part of a truly integratedfair housingpolicy.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1950s and 1960s, major progress has been made to
combat de jure racial segregation in our schools, neighborhoods,
and workplaces. In seminal cases like Shelley v. Kraemer' and Brown
v. Board of Education2 , the United States Supreme Court struck
down the major legal impediments to integration. President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society marked a commitment by the
government to take affirmative steps to provide fair and affordable
housing throughout America. Yet after decades of white flight,
crumbling housing projects, and a growing gap between the rich
and the poor, neighborhoods in America are more segregated than
ever.
The disastrous effects of concentrated poverty coupled with entrenched racial segregation are well documented. Poverty is a
*

University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2010; Georgetown University,

B.A., 2005. I would like to thank Professors Judith Levy and Saul Green, whose course on
fair housing prompted my interest in this subject, Professor Rachel Croskery-Roberts for
nurturing my legal research and writing skills, and the members of the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform for their helpful edits. I would also like to thank my loving wife, Jean,
and my family for supporting me in writing this Note and in all my life endeavors.
1.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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self-perpetuating phenomenon, as the net wealth of a child's parents is an important factor for predicting academic success, which
in turn correlates strongly with future wealth Opportunities for
upward mobility are often tied to the informal social networks in
one's community, making isolated poverty difficult to overcome.
Concentrated poverty leads to increased pressures on law enforcement, infrastructure, schools, and families.5 Concentrated and
isolated poverty is also felt disproportionately by blacks, which
leads to racial animosity, despair, and, in some cases, violent riots.6
More than forty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, 7 racial and economic integration has remained, for the
most part, an ideal. Despite the statutory and regulatory language
that requires the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to take affirmative steps to truly integrate
neighborhoods through its housing programs,' HUD has shown a
lack of political will to fulfill this part of its mandate. One of the
major impediments to a national policy of racial integration in
housing is municipal opposition, both through political pressure"
and zoning laws that keep low- and moderate-income housing from
being built in wealthy communities. ° In many cases, municipalities
will resist racial and economic integration while simultaneously
accepting federal money that requires them to take affirmative
steps towards greater integration."

3.
See Dalton Conley, Capitalfor College: ParentalAssets and Postsecondary Schooling, 74
Soc. EDUC. 59, 68 (2001).
4.
See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1851-52 (1994). "All other things being equal, employers
would hire people they know and like ... ." Id. This process of accumulating "social capital"
begins in churches, schools, PTAs, Little Leagues, and other community-based associations
that "open the doors of opportunity in the business world" for parents and their children
later in life. Id. See also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 150 (1993) (documenting the close
connection between social and spatial mobility).
5.
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 136-42.
6.
Id. at 58.
7.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2006).
8.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2) (2006).
9.
See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1205 (2d Cir. 1987)
(describing community opposition to housing integration plans); Ford, supra note 4, at 1864
(describing political resistance to diversifying communities through annexation).
10. James J. Hartnett, Note, Affordable Housing Exclusionary Zoning and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to FosterStatewide Racial Integration,68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 96-98.
11.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987);
Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984); Otero v. N.Y. City
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F.
Supp. 2d 33, 73, 75 (D. Mass. 2002).
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This Note will examine how the Federal False Claims Act
(FCA) , in conjunction with the Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)
and its implementing regulations, 3 can be used as an effective enforcement mechanism of racial and economic integration policy by
penalizing local municipalities that shirk their obligations while
accepting federal funds. Part I begins by examining some of the
historic causes of housing segregation and why it persists today.
Part II presents a novel enforcement approach that has emerged in
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.
This approach could have national ramifications in forcing all local
municipalities that receive federal housing grants to take aggressive
steps in furthering fair housing. Finally, Part III proposes affirmative measures that courts and HUD should mandate on state and
local actors to ensure that all municipalities provide their fair share
of affordable housing. Specifically, Congress should make regional
coordination of housing policy and inclusionary zoning a precondition for receiving HUD funds. Only by taking affirmative, local
measures to undo decades of segregated housing policies will we
have a realistic opportunity for economic and racial integration in
America.

I. HISTORIC

AND CURRENT IMPEDIMENTS TO

RACIAL INTEGRATION

Where one chooses to live is a complex and personal decision.
Often, people who consider themselves progressive and inclusive
when it comes to issues of race give in to "more visceral personal
4
needs of comfort and security" when making housing decisions.1
Many find racial homogeneity to be more comfortable 5 and
stereotypes about minorities often lead people to believe that white
neighborhoods are safer.16 In other cases, pure racial animosity

12.
13.

31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31.

14.

SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UN-

DERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2004); see also Peter Applebome, IntegrationFaces a New

Test in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at WK3 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/weekinreview/
23applebome.html.
15.
See CASHIN, supra note 14, at 10 ("Studies show that whites are willing to pay a 13
percent premium to live in all-white neighborhoods.").
16.
See Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial ResidentialSegregation, 29 ANN.

REv. Soc. 167, 182 (2003) (finding white perceptions of "joblessness, welfare dependence,
[and] proclivity to criminal behavior" as motivating aversion to black neighbors).
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drives individuals to live in communities of their own race.17 Personal preferences and prejudice are certainly impediments to
integrating our neighborhoods, but they are not the only factors at
play. Historically, government action, and inaction, have served to
institutionalize racial segregation and inflame personal prejudices
that have further divided our communities.
A. Historic Causes of Racial Segregation
One of the earliest legal impediments to racial integration to
emerge after the Civil War was the use of restrictive covenants to
keep minorities from purchasing houses in all-white neighborhoods. The practice involved a legal contract, signed by a number
of neighbors, that prohibited owners from conveying their property to minorities. 1 The agreement, or covenant, was restrictive on
current and future owners of the property and enforceable in
court. 9 In Shelley v. Kraemer, the United States Supreme Court
found the enforcement of such agreements to be in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
Another way that municipalities have historically acted to institutionalize segregation is through the placement of affordable
housing in traditionally black neighborhoods, thus perpetuating
the myths and realities of the black ghetto.2 In Gautreauxv. Chicago
Housing Authority,2 2 city council members in Chicago sought to

block the construction of affordable housing in their precincts after their constituents voiced opposition. 3 As a result, affordable
housing that was disproportionately inhabited by AfricanAmericans continued to be concentrated in historically black
neighborhoods and contributed to the continued segregation of
the city.2 4 After twenty-five years of litigation, affordable and racially

mixed housing finally began to spread to predominantly white sec17.
While few respondents to social surveys will admit to harboring racial prejudice,
available data is highly suggestive. Id. at 185-91 (compiling the findings of four different
studies on individual racial preferences in housing). For example, in one study, when asked
what would be the racial composition of their ideal neighborhood, 25 percent of white respondents preferred no blacks. Id. at 186 tbl.2. A preference for racial homogeneity among
whites was also highly correlated with high degrees of unfavorable racial stereotypes for
blacks. Id. at 188.
18.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
19.
See id. at 4-5.
20.
Id. at 20.
21.
M.ssEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 56.
22.
296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
23.
Id. at 910.
24.
Id. at 910-11.
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tions of the city.25 In a similar case, United States v. Yonkers Board of
26
Education, the city of Yonkers, and certain community members,
fought for years to prevent public housing from being built in
white neighborhoods and actively obstructed court-ordered reme-

dies

for

over

fifteen

years.2 '

Both

Gautreaux and

Yonkers

demonstrate how the placement of affordable housing and the parochial interests and prejudices of local municipalities combine to
perpetuate racial segregation. The cases also display the extent to
which localities will fight both economic and racial "outsiders"
from entering their communities and the difficulties in enforcing
fair housing laws.
B. Modern Impediments to Integrationin Housing
Although restrictive covenants based on race are no longer enforceable, exclusionary zoning practices are in many ways the
modern equivalent. Zoning ordinances that restrict development
to single-family dwellings with characteristics that make average
prices higher (e.g., lot size, distance from the street, density restrictions), limit housing options in neighborhoods-and sometimes
entire towns-to the wealthy.28 While federal law does not prohibit
economic discrimination, often lurking beneath the surface of
these ordinances is racial discrimination. For example, in Anderson
Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs,29 the City denied a developer's
request for a special use permit to build a development that included sixty units of affordable housing. 0 The court found that
discriminatory remarks made at public hearings and statistics showing a disparate impact on minorities were sufficient evidence to
conclude that the City of Saratoga Springs was in part motivated by
25.
See generally, James E. Rosenbaum & Stefanie DeLuca, What Kinds of Neighborhoods
Change Lives? The Chicago Gautreaux HousingProgram and Recent Mobility Programs,41 IND. L.
REv. 653 (2008) (surveying experiences of low-income black families who moved to predominately white neighborhoods as a result of the Gautreauxdecision).
26.
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
United States v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 239 F.3d 211, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2001).
27.
See, e.g., S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 71928.
20 (N.J. 1975) (finding residential zones were designated exclusively for single-family homes
that effectively limits housing in Mount Laurel to "persons of at least middle income"); see
also James L. Mitchell, Will Empowering Developers to ChallengeExclusionary Zoning Increase Suburban Housing Choice, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGsrr. 119, 119 (2004); James J. Hartnett,
Note, Affordable Housing Exclusionary Zoning and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster
Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 96-98 (detailing how exclusionary zoning
practices maintain enclaves of affluence or of homogeneity).
29.
557 F. Supp. 2d 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
30.
Id. at 335-36.
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a discriminatory animus. 3 ' Courts may also find state action dis-

criminatory, absent overt animus, based solely on a disparate
impact theory by producing statistical evidence of a disproportionately negative effect on racial minorities resulting from state
zoning decisions. 32
Even where there is no explicit racial hostility, exclusionary zoning can have the effect of perpetuating segregation in much the
same way as restrictive covenants. The connection between racial
and economic segregation is not hard to see. Because of historic
attempts to marginalize African-Americans through housing, education, and professional opportunities, they are less likely to be
able to afford a house in a wealthy neighborhood. In a country
with such a recent history of legalized racial segregation and racism, even a "race-neutral policy [of housing opportunity] could be
expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic stratification."3 3 In this sense, adopting a race-neutral policy towards
housing that fails to assess the inherent socio-economic disparity
tied to race is unlikely to significantly dismantle racial segregation.
Conceptually, restrictive covenants and zoning ordinances are
also similar in that they both attempt to artificially restrict entry
into neighborhoods by contracting and legislating the preferences
of the current population for future generations, thus ensuring
that the economic and racial make-up of the community will not
change. Despite popular belief, there is nothing natural or inevitable about how we set municipal boundaries, whether in terms of
"geography ...

,

commitment to self-government or private prop-

erty., 34

Rather, municipal boundaries are the manifestation of the
initial inhabitants' values and preferences as demonstrated
through ordinances, exclusive zoning policies, and restrictive
covenants.35 By defining the terms of membership in a community
through zoning restrictions, it becomes unlikely that there will be
any challenge to these preferences that would accommodate
change.36 As a result, restrictive covenants and exclusionary zoning
make mobility between political spaces less likely and ensure that
historic housing patterns based on explicit racial animosity will
remain unchanged.
31.
Id. at 340-41.
32.
See Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d
Cir.), affd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
33.
Ford, supra note 4, at 1852.
34.
Id. at 1857.
35.
See id. at 1871.
36.
See id.
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This brief overview of some of the historic and modern impediments to integration shows that exclusionary zoning and the
placement of affordable housing, as determined at the local level,
serves to perpetuate racial segregation, even when these decisions
are not motivated by racism. So long as zoning powers are controlled by local governments and decisions regarding the
placement of affordable housing are controlled by localities, segregation is unlikely to be eliminated. Gautreux and Yonkers also
demonstrate the extent of community opposition to affordable
housing placement and the difficulties of enforcing fair housing
laws through traditional court action. New enforcement mechanisms and incentives must be developed to force municipalities to
take racial segregation seriously and to consider the interests of
those living outside their borders.
C. The Promise and Failuresof the FairHousingAct of 1968
and Subsequent Enforcement
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 promised to begin a new
era of racial and economic opportunity in housing.3 7 Senator Walter Mondale, the chief sponsor of the FHA, asserted that the
purpose of the law was "to replace the ghettos 'by [sic] truly integrated and balanced living patterns.' 3 8 Senator William Proxmire,
a co-sponsor of the FHA on the Senate, Banking and Currency
Committee, stated rather loftily that Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 will establish a "policy of dispersal through open housing ...look[ing] to the eventual dissolution of the ghetto and the

construction of low and moderate income housing in the suburbs.0 9 While the FHA "was designed primarily to prohibit
discrimination in the sale, rental, financing, or brokerage of private
housing, and to provide federal enforcement procedures for
remedying such discrimination,"40 the Act also charged the Secretary of HUD, and through him other agencies administering
federally assisted housing programs, with considering "the impact
of proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration
1
in the area in which the proposed housing is to be built.'

37.
See 114 CONG. REc. 3421-22 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
38.
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG.
Rc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)).
39.
114 CONG. REc. 2985 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
40.
Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973).
41.
Id. at 1134.
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HUD's obligations under the FHA, however, go beyond administering housing programs in a non-discriminatory fashion. 2 The
statute instructs HUD to administer its grant programs so as "affirmatively to further" the Act's goals of true integration. 2 In
Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals traced the evolution of Congress'
housing policy from one that was neutral on race to one that
sought to promote racial integration in housing, with the goal of
undoing the effects of decades of segregation." The court explained that the 1949 Housing Act was neutral on race and did
nothing to address the private and government actions that contributed to racial segregation. 45 The passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 went one step further by prohibiting public housing programs that had discriminatory effects, but did not explicitly
embrace an active policy of housing integration.6 Finally, the FHA
charged the Secretary of HUD with affirmatively promoting fair
housing. 47 As expressed by a supporting Senator, the purpose of the
FHA was to remedy the "weak intentions" that have led to the federal government "sanctioning discrimination in housing
throughout this Nation." 4 Provisions of the FHA offered the prom-

ise of widespread integration, both by policing the private housing
market and by affirmatively administering programs that would
undo years of government-sanctioned racial segregation.
Since the beginning of the fair housing movement and the civil
rights movement, there has been tension between the twin goals of
increasing the stock of affordable housing and increasing racial
integration in housing. Arguably, building massive high-rises on
cheap land will produce the greatest number of housing units per
dollar. However, cheap land is often found in already economically
depressed minority neighborhoods, and adding hundreds of affordable housing units leads to further economic and racial
isolation. The tension between increasing the number of units of
42.
See NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5) (2006)).
43.
Id.
44.
Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809,816 (3d. Cir. 1970).
45.
See id.
46.
See id.
47.
Id.
48.
Michael Allen, Strong Enforcement is Required to Promote Integration on the Basis of Race and Disability, Testimony at the Public Hearing at the National Commission on
Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 1 (Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Michael Allen, Testimony] (quoting 114 CONG. REc. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke)) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.prrac.org/projects/
fair_housing_commission/boston/allen.pdf.
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affordable housing and increasing racial integration was exemplified in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,49 where the

defendant Housing Authority alleged that it was faced with the
choice of preferring white tenants in a new housing development
(effectively establishing a quota) or risk tipping the racial composition
of the neighborhood
towards further non-white
"ghettoization.""° Ultimately, the court found that considerations of
racial integration could justify limiting the number of units available to blacks, though the burden on the defendants to show a
genuine need for such quotas is a "heavy one., 51 The FHA offers no

guidance for balancing these competing concerns but both must
be given due weight in promulgating an effective fair housing program.
Although HUD and its local affiliates have been empowered to
tackle the difficult problem of persistent racial segregation, they
have not always had the political will to do so. Over the course of
the last half-century, the goal of increasing the stock of affordable
housing has won out, often to the detriment of racial integration.
Affordable housing, as typified by the housing projects in Goutreaux, is frequently built in large apartment buildings on the
cheapest available land, in the least politically resistant neighborhoods.52 Given finite government resources, such a policy makes
sense if the only goal is to create as much affordable housing as
possible. Unfortunately, as discussed above, the result of concentrating affordable housing in poor neighborhoods is increased
segregation and the perpetuation of poverty among minorities.
Any comprehensive fair housing policy will need to include an enforcement mechanism to ensure that HUD and local authorities
take the politically difficult steps necessary to address racial and
economic segregation. The next section discusses a novel
approach to private enforcement of the FHA, brought by the
Anti-Discrimination Center of New York, that promises to have
widespread impact on how municipalities use HUD grants to promote fair housing.

49.
50.
51.
52.

484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1124, 1136.
Id. at 1136.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 56.
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II. Anti-DiscriminationCenter v. Westchester County:
USING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO PROMOTE
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Private citizens, and the non-profit organizations that represent
them, provide an alternative to HUD in the legal battle against racial segregation. Whether it has been by suing HUD to comply with
its own enabling statutes, or by suing local municipalities to comply
with HUD regulations, private citizens and non-profit organizations, including the NAACP, the ACLU, and fair housing centers,
have waged painstaking battles to ensure that the promise of the
53
FHA and Civil Rights legislation has a chance to become a reality.
This section presents one such case in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Anti-DiscriminationCenter v. Westchester County, which uses the False Claims Act to promote racial
and economic integration.54
A. Background
Anti-Discrimination Center v. Westchester County involves a dispute
over the administration of a popular HUD grant program by municipalities in the County of Westchester, New York.55 Westchester, a
suburb of New York City, is one of the wealthiest counties in America.56 The New York metropolitan area and its surrounding suburbs
is also one of the most segregated regions in America.5 According
to data from the 2000 U.S. Census and data provided by the
County itself, more than half of the municipalities in Westchester
53.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987);
Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Gautreaux v.
Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
54.
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
55.
Id. at 376.
56.
According to data provided by the Bureau of Economic Statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Westchester County's per capita income ranked seventh among
counties in the United States. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, REGIONAL ECONOMIC AcCOUNTS: PER CAPITA INCOME BY COUNTY FOR 2007 (2007) http://www.bea.gov/
regional/reis/crius.cfm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).

57.
John Iceland, Daniel H. Weinberg & Erika Steinmetz, Racial and Ethnic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000 5, thl. Al (unpublished paper, on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/housingpatterns/working.papers.html. New York ranks third on the
study's dissimilarity index, which measures the amount of movement that would be necessary to achieve perfectly integrated neighborhoods according to the racial makeup of the
region, and first on the isolation index, which measures the extent to which minority members are exposed only to one another. Id.
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have a population of less than three percent black citizens, despite
a large population of black residents in pockets of the county."
The average non-Hispanic white neighborhood is 92.4 percent
white (considering only non-Hispanic blacks and whites) and the
average non-Hispanic black neighborhood is 65.8 percent nonHispanic black. 59 Despite an apparent end to dejure segregation in
the 1950s and 60s, measures of racial isolation and concentration
among blacks more than doubled in Westchester County between
1950 and 2000. 60
Westchester County was also the setting for United States v. Yonkers
Board of Education, a fifteen-year desegregation battle in which
white residents and their city council representatives fought to
keep affordable housing from being built in predominantly white
neighborhoods. 6' Not surprisingly, many of the municipalities in
Westchester continue to resist efforts to build affordable housing
within their borders. 2 Westchester acknowledged local resistance
to affordable housing,6 3 but maintained that a cooperative approach was the "most prudent, realistic, and productive
approach." 6 Rather than withhold funding from municipalities for
failing to affirmatively further fair housing, the County acquiesced
to local resistance and continued to build affordable housing in
predominantly black municipalities. 65 Despite the long history of
racial tensions in Westchester County and the stark data that revealed racial isolation among blacks, Westchester failed to consider
race as an impediment to fair housing during the six-year period it
66
participated in the HUD-funded program.
The plaintiff Anti-Discrimination Center claimed that Westchester County defrauded the federal government by accepting
more than $52 million in federal funds over a six-year period and
certifying that it would affirmatively further fair housing, even
though it ignored race as an impediment to achieving the goals of

58.
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, No. 06-CV-2860, 2008 WL 6802246, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008).
59.
Expert Report of Andrew Beveridge 21, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination
Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester County, No. 06-CV-02860 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008)
(Document 81-6).
60.
Id. 27.
61.
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
62.
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, No. 06-CV-2860, 2009 WL 455269, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009) (summary judgment opinion).
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at *16.
65.
Id. at *10, *16.
66.
Id. at *13.
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the program.6 ' Although Westchester County vigorously fought the
lawsuit, the court ultimately accepted the Anti-Discrimination Center's argument and granted summary judgment on most of its
claims." Faced with roughly $180 million in penalties (due to
treble damages as well as statutory damages) and the prospect of
losing another $30 million in HUD funding, the County finally setfled, agreeing to pay a $52 million fine and, among other things,
begin building affordable housing units in the affluent white suburban towns across the county.69
B. False Claims Act
The Anti-Discrimination Center's legal argument focused on
three major statutes and their implementing regulations:0 (1) the
False Claims Act,7 (2) the Fair Housing Act,7 2 and (3) the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974. 7" The remainder of this
section carefully examines the False Claims Act and analyzes how
the Anti-Discrimination Center used the Act to enforce the fair
housing provisions of the Fair Housing Act and the Housing and
Community Development Act.
1. History and Overview
The False Claims Act (FCA), also known as the "Lincoln Law,"
was enacted in 1863 in response to Union Army contractors who
engaged in fraud, price-gouging, and supplying the army with defective weapons and supplies.74 The FCA gave the government new
tools and more stringent penalties that went beyond common law
fraud to fight crooked contractors. In its original form, the FCA
67.
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, No. 06-CV-2860, 2008 WL 6802246, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008).
68.
See id.
69.
Sam Roberts, Housing Accord in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at Al. The
Westchester County Board of Legislators approved the settlement in a 12-5 vote on September 23, 2009. Mike Jaccarino, Westchester Oks Affordable HousingPush in Posh Nabes, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 24, 2009, at 49.
70. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548,551 (S.D.N.Y 2009).
71. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006).
72.42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-19 (2006).
73.42 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2) (2006).
74.
1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS 1-3 (3d ed. Supp.
2010-1); see alsoVt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781

(2000).
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offered double damages, as well as $2,000, for each false claim
made by a contractor.75
The truly unique provision in the FCA, however, was the qui
tam 6 cause of action, which gave standing to any individual to
bring a suit on behalf of the government for a false claim made by
a contractor. Qui tam actions have been around since the thirteenth century in England," when private parties used them as a
means of gaining access to the royal courts because the king's interests could be adjudicated only in this setting. In modern times,
granting private citizens with prosecutorial-type power has been
used to combat the lack of an effective governmental enforcement
body or a corrupt police force. 79 The qui tam provision of the FCA

was directed at whistleblowers and disenchanted employees who
were often the only means for uncovering evidence of malfeasance
by government contractors. s° Often these "informers" did not
themselves have clean hands, and one Senator who sponsored the
FCA described the purpose of the qui tam action as "setting a rogue
to catch a rogue.,81
Enforcement by private citizens, referred to as relators, s2 was a
key element of the Act. Providing private citizens with an incentive
to enforce the FCA brought the potential for a more dynamic enforcement of government interests and an extra level of protection
to the public treasury. Courts viewed the role of the citizen as
countering the "slow-going public vessel" of government enforcement and moving quickly and effectively to protect government
policy and funds. 3
Despite its promise for wide use and ample damages, the FCA
fell into relative obscurity until World War II, when government
spending and the use of private contractors exploded. 4 With the
growth of government assistance programs in the post-World War
II period, the FCA "began to be used by the government against
75.
1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-10.
76.
Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase: "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso,"
which translates roughly to "he who acts on the King's behalf as well as his own." I BOESE,
supra note 74, at 1-7.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 1-9.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 1-9 & n.28 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863) (remarks of Sen. Howard)).
82.
The term "relator" describes the party who brings a suit on behalf of the government. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 621 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "ex rel.").
83.
1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-11 (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366
(D. Or. 1885)).
84.
Id. at 1-13.
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persons and corporations other than government contractors. ""'
For example, programs including agriculture and housing subsidies, Medicare, and Food Stamps all expanded the context of the
FCA.16 Enforcement of the Act changed from focusing primarily on
military spending to encompassing numerous social welfare policies, touching on almost every area involving government
spending.87 At the same time the FCA was being revived, the qui tam
provision of the FCA was significantly curtailed in amendments to
the Act in 1943.8" Congress feared private plaintiffs, who had done
little to expose fraud or contribute to the prosecution, would simply re-file government claims and collect a large portion of the
government's damages. 9 For the next forty years, the FCA became
primarily a government tool. 90

In 1986, however, Congress revived the dual purpose of the FCA
as both a strong anti-fraud measure to deter recipients of government funds as well as a check on lax government enforcement.
The 1986 amendments bolstered the qui tam provision and increased the monetary penalties to potential defrauders. 9' One of
the provisions of the 1986 amendments lowered the intent/knowledge requirement from specific intent to defraud the
government to something akin to gross negligence. 92 The amendments also increased damages from double to treble damages and
updated the penalty from $2,000 per false claim to between $5,000
and $10,000 per false claim.93 It also expanded the role of qui tam
94
relators by repealing the government's veto power over claims
and by increasing the percentage of damages recoverable under
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
Id.
88.
United
89. 89 CONG. REC. 7570-71 (1943) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys). See, e.g.,
States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). In Hess, the qui tam relator made a direct
copy of the government's criminal indictment against Hess, re-filed it as a civil action under
the FCA, and was awarded half of the damages. Id. at 545-46.
90.

1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-13.

91.
Id. at 1-21 to 22.
92.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006) ("[T~he terms 'knowing' and 'knowingly' mean that a
person, with respect to information[,] (1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts
in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information; and no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required."); see also, United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
93.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
94.
Id. § 3729(d). It is precisely this problem of federal agencies becoming too cozy
with contractors that calls for allowing private citizens to independently bring an FCA action. As this Note later discusses, HUD's inability to stand strong against local municipalities
that violate the Fair Housing Act is evidence of the propriety of applying the FCA to cases
such as Anti-DiscriminationCenter.

SUMMER

20101

Citizen Police

1151

the Act by relators." The modem FCA signals a strong public policy commitment to combating "rampant fraud and governmental
acquiescence. 06
The types of parties that are found liable under the FCA have
also changed since its inception at the height of the Civil War. Although fraud perpetrated by military contractors still commands a
sizeable share of FCA actions,97 in the last decade, healthcare fraud
cases have significantly outpaced military fraud cases. 98 One recent
qui tam action under the FCA resulted in a $325 million judgment
against a clinical medical laboratory for overbilling. 99 The Act is
increasingly being applied to nontraditional areas such as environmental compliance, financial services involved in the sale of
government bonds, the use of government land for oil, gas, and
mining extraction, and federal grants for scientific research. 0
As the nature of government spending evolves, so does the applicable contexts for FCA enforcement. Although the FCA is
commonly thought of as an anti-fraud measure, it is often used to
enforce compliance with government procedures and mandates.
For example, courts have found liability under the FCA in cases
involving non-disclosure of information in contracting,' substandard testing of products provided to the government, 0 2 and false
representation of compliance with government regulations. 13 With
the growth of federal regulations, the federal government increasingly attaches regulatory strings when allocating funds, making a
failure to comply with government policy and procedures-and to
accurately certify compliance-as egregious a violation as failing to
provide the service or product at all. It is these types of regulatory
95.
96.
97.

Id.
1 BOESE, supranote 74, at 1-17.
SeeJohn T. Boese, Fundamentals of the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement,
in THE 7TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND Qui Tam ENFORCEMENT A-47 (2008). Qui tam and non-qui tam actions at the Department of Defense
totaled over $3.8 billion from 1987-2007. Id.
98.
From 1987-2007, qui tam and non-qui tam actions at the Department of Health and
Human Services totaled over $13 billion. Id. at A-46.
99.
1 BOESE, supranote 74, at 1-37 (Supp. 2007-2)
100.

CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

§§ 2:12-2:19 (Andrea G. Nadel et al. eds., 2004).
101. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Atkinson v. Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co., 2000 WL
1207162 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (alleging shipbuilding contract knowingly omitted significant costs
in contractor's final proposal to government).
102. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Compton v. Midwest Specialties, Inc., 142 F.3d 296
(6th Cir. 1998) (contractor supplying brake-shoe kits for Army Jeeps failed to periodically
test the products in conformity with government regulation).
103. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F.Supp. 636 (W.D. Wis.
1995) (military contractor's knowing failure to comply with environmental regulations even
though it certified that it would, constitutes a false claim under the FCA).
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compliance cases that formed the basis of Anti-Discrimination Center's claim against Westchester County.

2. Mechanics of the False Claims Act
The elements of an FCA claim are detailed and complex and differ based on the type of claim at issue. This section discusses the
elements that are relevant to an FCA action under the fair housing
laws and that pose the most difficulty for a qui tam plaintiff. Several
treatises
are available for a fuller discussion of the mechanics of the
04
FCA.1

a. Liability

The most common source of liability under the FCA is making
"direct" false claims to the government.' Section 3729(a) (1) of
the FCA provides that any person who "knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United
States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval ... is liable to the United States Government .... ,106 The

second source of liability is when a person "knowingly makes, uses,
or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a
false or fraudulent claim paid .... ,'07 Liability for producing false

records or making false statements necessarily requires that a false
claim be made. l"" Where government contracts and grants require
certification of compliance with government regulations and conditions, verification of actual compliance may require costly
oversight and extra layers of bureaucracy. The risk of false compliance certifications is perhaps the greatest justification for a qui tam
action and treble damages, since it provides incentive for whistleblowers and private investigators to uncover deception that might
otherwise go undiscovered.' 9 Where the government lacks the re104.

See generally 1 BOESE, supra note 74, at 1-3;

SYLVIA,

supra note 100;

AMERICAN BAR

ASSOCIATION, THE 7TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND

Qui

Tam ENFORCEMENT (2008).

105. Boese, supra note 74, at § 2.01 [A]; Boese, supranote 97, at A-3.
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
107. Id. § 3729 (a) (2).
108. Boese, supra note 97, at A-4.
109. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 13 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5279
(enhancing the qui tam provisions is necessary to "break[] the current 'conspiracy of silence'
among Government contractor employees." (quotingJohn Phillips, testifying for the Center
for Law in the Public Interest)).
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sources to audit every claim, such an enforcement mechanism allows for efficient oversight." °
b. Qualified "Persons"Under the False Claims Act
Virtually any individual or corporate entity that makes a claim
for federal payment qualifies as a "person" for the purposes of the
FCA."' The statute is less clear, however, when it comes to public
entities. In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens," 2 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a long-running circuit
split over the ability of a qui tam plaintiff to bring suit against a
State. In Stevens, the Supreme Court held that "the False Claims Act
does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability" in qui tam actions.' 1 The Court's reasoning was based on a historical and textual
analysis of the Act, and from the punitive nature of damages, which
the Court found did not typically apply to States."'
The Supreme Court, however, has found that municipalities and
county governments are "persons" subject to liability under the
FCA, in claims brought either by the federal government or a private relator."5 Municipal governments are treated differently
because, historically, municipal corporations have been deemed to
be "persons" that "may sue and be sued.""16 Because a substantial

amount of federal aid goes directly to town, city, and county governments, ensuring compliance with federal policies that form the
basis for allocating such funds is an important use of the FCA.
c. Qui Tam Provision
As previously discussed, the qui tam provision allows any individual or organization to bring suit in the name of the United States
government so long as they meet certain procedural and

110. See id. at 14 ("The bill adds no new layers of bureaucracy, new regulations, or new
Federal police powers. Instead, the bill takes the sensible approach of increasing penalties
for wrongdoing, and rewarding those private individuals who take significant personal risks
to bring such wrongdoing to light." (quoting D. Wayne Silby, representative of the Business
Executives for National Security)).
111. Boese, supranote 97, atA-7.
112. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
113. Id. at 787-88. The U.S. Department of Justice, however, contends that it can still
sue a State for false claims under the Stevens decision. See Boese, supra note 97, at A-7.
114. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 780-88.
115. Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex reL Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132-34 (2003).
116. Boese, supra note 97, atA-8.
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jurisdictional requirements." 7 The mechanics of the qui tam provision are complex, but a major concern for the court on the motion
to dismiss in Anti-Discrimination Center was the "public disclosure"
jurisdictional bar."8 Although the 1986 amendments to the FCA
generally expanded the viability of the qui tam actions, drafters
were still concerned about "parasitic suits"' 9 coming on the heels
of government investigations or publicly available reports. 20 As a
result, Congress attached a new jurisdictional bar that denied a
court subject-matter jurisdiction where the qui tam claim is
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General
or the person2 bringing the action is an original source of the
information. '

"Original source" is defined as "an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action .... ,,122
In Anti-Discrimination Center, the plaintiff's claim was based on information requests under the New York Freedom of Information
Law (FOIL) ,12 which is the state equivalent of the federal Freedom
of Information Act. 2 4 One of the main questions that arose in the
motion to dismiss was whether the FOIL request qualifies as a
"public disclosure" for the purposes of the FCA, and if it does,
whether the plaintiff was the "original source" of the information.2 1 Once a court determines that a claim is based on a public
117. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).
118. United States ex ret. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
119. Boese, supra note 97, at A-17. "Parasitic suits" refer to complaints stating allegations
or information readily available to the public, for example, from government prosecution or
publicly disclosed investigations. It.
120. United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). Hess is a prototypical case
of a parasitic suit, in which the qui tam plaintiff copied a criminal indictment of electrical
contractors and incorporated it into a civil action under the FCA, essentially adding no new
facts to the case but requesting half of any subsequent civil damages.
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(2006).
122. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
123. N.Y. PUB. OFF., art. 6, §§ 84-90 (2006).
124. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); United States ex reL Anti-Discrimination Ctr. Of Metro N.Y.,
Inc. v. Westchester County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
125. Anti-DiscriminationCtr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80.
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he was the
disclosure, the plaintiff faces a high burden to show that
26
disclosure.
the
in
information
the
of
source
original
A circuit split has emerged with regard to whether administrative reports produced by state and local governments qualify as
public disclosures that trigger the jurisdictional bar against qui tam
actions under the FCA. Although most circuit courts agree that
administrative reports produced by the federal government-such
as those produced through government audits or investigationsdo trigger the jurisdictional bar, they differ on whether the same
standard applies to state and local government reports. For example, in United States ex. rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, a local
government entity produced reports that contained the fraudulent
claims and thus formed the basis for the FCA allegations, and the
reports may have been the only way for a private citizen to discover
that a claim was made at all. 27 In Dunleavy, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals interpreted the jurisdictional bar narrowly to allow for
qui tam actions based on administrative reports produced by local
government actors. 18 Although the court based this conclusion on
a textual analysis, it also reached its conclusion on policy
grounds.19 First, the government reports may have been the only
way for a private citizen to discover that a claim was made at all.
Secondly, the court found that applying the jurisdictional bar
would be a contradiction of the FCA's intent if the very reports that
were fraudulently submitted to the federal government would also
have the effect of immunizing the defrauder from prosecution by a
private citizen. Such a reading of the statute would contradict the
fundamental purpose of the 1986 amendments, which sought to
make it easier to uncover fraud when the defrauding party is the
only source of the information that would reveal the wrongdoing."'
The fact that the defrauding party in the case was a government
entity should not entitle it to2 greater protection than would be afforded a private contractor."3

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took a slightly different approach in Hays v. Hoffman, 33 finding that audit reports produced
by a state agency triggered the jurisdictional bar."34 Although the
126. See generally Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States ex reL Stone, 549 U.S. 457 (2007)
(describing the Supreme Court's test for meeting the "original source" requirement).
127. United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d 734 (3d Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at 745-46.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 745.
131. Id. at 746.
132. Id. at 745-46.
133. 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2003).
134. Id. at989.
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court distinguished the facts in its case from the facts in Dunleavy, it
found that in certain situations where the state agent is acting as an
auditor at the request of the federal government (as is required to
receive Medicaid payments), state reports would trigger the jurisdictional bar in much the same way as federal audits.
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to weigh
in on the matter of interpreting the jurisdictional bar of the FCA,
in Anti-Discrimination Center, the U.S. District Court for the South-

ern District of New York followed the Third Circuit's reading of the
FCA and found that information gleaned from a FOIL request
made by a private citizen could form the basis of an action under
the FCA.136 As was the case in Dunleavy, the district court reasoned
that there was value in citizens investigating state files and bringing
evidence of fraud to the federal government's attention, and that
construing the jurisdictional bar narrowly
was fully consistent with
3
the legislative purpose of the Act. 1

d. Scienter Requirement

To maintain liability under the FCA, the party making a claim
must knowingly make a false record or statement and must knowingly present a false claim to the government in order to receive
approval for a fraudulent claim. A person acts "knowingly" under
the FCA with respect to information where the person: "(1) has
actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information." 3 9 Although showing knowledge of falsity requires more than mere
negligence, the passage of the 1986 amendments made it clear that
the FCA did not require specific intent to defraud the government.'4° By explicitly defining knowledge, Congress intended to
avoid "ostrich-like" conduct by corporations that would make re4
covering false claims increasingly difficult.1'
Difficulties in proving knowledge are especially pronounced in
cases that involve ambiguous regulations. Defendants often argue
that a reasonable interpretation of a regulation (that later turns
135. Id. at 988.
136. United States ex reL Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
137. Id.
138. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) & (2) (2006).
139. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006).
140. SeeSYLVIA, supra note 100, § 4:45.
141. Id.
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out to be incorrect) proves a lack of knowledge that the defendant
made false statements or claims. 4 2 Although courts have approved
of this defense strategy,4 3 a plaintiff or relator may still offer evidence of knowledge of falsity that would contradict defendant's ex
post interpretation of the regulation and show that it is merely a
pretext.
C. Applying the False Claims Act to the FairHousingAct Context
The case of Anti-DiscriminationCenter v. Westchester County successfully demonstrates how the False Claims Act can be applied to the
fair housing context to promote greater housing integration.'" The
Civil Rights Act of 1964," 5 the Fair Housing Act of 1968,' the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 7 and their
implementing regulations form the basis for the certification requirements
of municipalities
that
receive
Community
Development Block Grants from the federal government.
1. Community Development Block Grants
One of the most popular Housing and Community Development programs administered by HUD is the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG). The purpose of the CDBG
program is to "develop viable communities by promoting integrated approaches that provide decent housing, a suitable living
environment, and expanded economic opportunities for low and
moderate income persons." 4" HUD defines community develop-

ment broadly to include activities such as providing housing and
community centers, rehabilitating public and private buildings,
acquiring property for public use, and other projects that serve the

142. Id. § 4:38.
143. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the reasonableness of defendant contractor's interpretation of applicable accounting standards may be relevant to whether it knowingly submitted false claims).
144. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a-6 (2006).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006).
148. Office of Community Planning and Development of U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development Home Page, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/
program-offices/comm.planning (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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general community interest.4 9 The program was established by
President Gerald Ford's Administration in 1974 and has since administered nearly $120 billion to state and local governments. 50 In
2008, the program gave over $3.8 billion in regularly allocated
funds.' Currently, over 1,200 municipalities and counties in fortynine states and Puerto Rico receive CDBG funds.5 2 Grants range in
value from $72,000 for a small island off the coast of Florida to
$180 million for New York City.55 Because of their widespread and
sometimes substantial impact on municipal budgets, states and local municipalities have come to rely54 on CDBG grants as part of
their efforts to combat urban blight.'

2. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing under the
Civil Rights Act and Fair Housing Act
As a requirement of receiving CDBG funds, grantees must submit certifications to HUD that they have "conducted and
administered [development programs] in conformity with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ...and the Fair Housing Act ... , and ... will
affirmatively further fair housing ... so as to give maximum feasi-

ble priority to activities which will benefit low- and moderateincome families ....
149. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Description of State-Administered Community Development Block Grant Program, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/
programs/stateadmin/index.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
150. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FIsCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET SUMMARY 8 (2008) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy09/fy09budget.pdf
151. Id. at 12.
152. Excel Spreadsheet Detailing Individual Municipal Grants (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
about/budget/budget09/ (click "All Grants - Excel" hyperlink to download the file).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Community Development Block Grants: The Impact of CDBG on Our Communities:
Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on
FinancialServices, 109th Cong. 33-36 (2006) (statement of Clifford W. Graves) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://
financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109-85.pdf; Press Release, Office of Governor Deval
Patrick, Governor Patrick Announces $40.4 Million in Statewide Community Development
Grants (Aug. 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=gov3pressrelease&L=l&L0=
Home&sid=Agov3&b=pressrelease&f=081309_community-development-grants&csid=Agov3
(quoting various members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation as to the impact of
CDBG funds on local communities).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2)-(3) (2006) (internal citations omitted). The affirmatively
further fair housing ("AFH") requirement is set forth in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(d) and (e) (5), and is incorporated into the certification requirement of DCBG fund-

SUMMER

2010]

Citizen Police

1159

The implementing regulations clearly set forth the condition
that grantees must "affirmatively further fair housing" (AFFH). 56
Grantees satisfy this condition by (1) conducting an analysis to
identify impediments to fair housing choice, (2) taking appropriate actions to overcome any impediments identified, and5 7 (3)
maintaining records reflecting the analysis and actions taken.
The court in Anti-Discrimination Center had to first determine the
scope of the AFFH requirement and then conduct a factual analysis to determine whether defendant Westchester County had falsely
certified compliance. In ruling against Westchester County on its
motion to dismiss, the court found that the AFFH certification requirement mandated that CDBG fund recipients analyze race as an
impediment to fair housing.58 The court came to this conclusion
by looking to the history of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the FHA, and the subsequent case law interpreting the statutes. 5 9 The Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ll persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation

on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."' 6° Under
the FHA, "the Secretary is required to 'administer the programs
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a
manner affirmatively to further the policies of" the statute." 6' The FHA
was "designed primarily to prohibit discrimination in the sale,
rental, financing, or brokerage of private housing and to provide
federal enforcement procedures for remedying discrimination so
that members of minority
races would not be condemned to re62
main in urban ghettos."

Given the clear legislative purpose of the FHA to combat racial
segregation and discrimination in housing, the court found that
ing by 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) and 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2009) (incorporating AFFH
requirement into CDBG consortium certifications), 24 C.F.R. § 570.602 (2009) (incorporating non-discrimination requirements of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1975), and 24 C.F.R. § 570.601(a)(2) (2009) (incorporating AFFH into the administration
of CDBG programs).
156. 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225 (grantees must actually conduct an analysis, take affirmative
steps to overcome impediments, and keep appropriate records), 570.601 (grantees must
certify that they have taken the required action).
157. Id.
158. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
159. Id. at 385-88.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006).
161. Anti-DiscriminationCtr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5)).
162. Id. (quoting Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973)
(emphasis added)).
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HUD was required to be particularly cognizant of race when administering public housing. 163 Specifically, HUD must consider how
its housing programs might result in greater racial and socioeconomic isolation.' Furthermore, the court found that HUD grants
were not intended as a passive prohibition against further discrimination in housing, but as a tool to promote further racially
and economically integrated housing patterns. 165 In sum, the court
took the soaring language of the FHA and its drafters literally in
imposing positive requirements on HUD.
The obligations imposed on HUD by the Civil Rights Act and
the Fair Housing Act apply equally to CDBG fund recipients. Specifically, the grantee must "analyze the impact of race on housing
opportunities and choice in its jurisdiction ... [and] must take ap1 66
propriate action to overcome the effects of those impediments.
The court found that given the history of racial discrimination and
segregation in Westchester County, the explicit statutory and regulatory framework described above, and HUD's written guidelines,
analyzing race as part of the mandatory impediments analysis is not
a question of ambiguous statutory interpretation but an obvious
requirement. 67 To interpret the AFFH requirement in a way that
excludes consideration of race "would be an absurd result."1',
Westchester County argued that its obligation to analyze race
under the AFFH requirement was ambiguous at best, and therefore the County could not be held liable for making false
statements.169 The court, however, found that the lack of explicit
guidance on conducting an impediments analysis in the statutes
and regulations did not contravene the County's responsibility to
163. See id. at 387-88.
164. See id. at 385 (quoting Otero, 484 F.2d at 1133-34) (The FHA requires the Secretary
to "consider 'the impact of proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration'
in the area in which the public housing will be built.' "); id. (quoting NAACP v. Sec'y of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987)) (In administering its grant programs, "HUD must 'consider the effect of a HUD grant on the racial and socio-economic
composition of the surrounding area.'").
165. See id. at 385.
166. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester
County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
167. Anti-DiscriminationCtr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88 (motion to dismiss).
168. Id. at 388. Specifically, Westchester County argued that nowhere on the face of the
Fair Housing Act or the implementing regulations is race mentioned as an impediment to
fair housing. Requiring the consideration of race in the analysis of impediments was a "matter of policy difference" and, therefore, Westchester County's alleged false statements were
the result of inadequate guidance in the relevant statutes and regulations. Id. The legal
interpretation of "affirmatively further fair housing" was an unsettled legal question that
could not attach liability under the False Claims Act. Id. (quoting Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll
Co., 483 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2007)).
169. Id.
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analyze racial discrimination-"the core concern behind the pas70
sage of the Fair Housing Act"-as an impediment to fair housing.
The "knowingly" requirement, however, poses a significant roadblock to future litigation. Given the broad mandate imposed by the
FHA and its implementing regulations, coupled with the selfregulating nature of the certification process and treble damages
under the FCA, future courts may find that the regulatory framework lacks the clarity necessary to find a defendant liable.
Although the court in Anti-Discrimination Center ruled on summary judgment that defendant Westchester County submitted false
claims, the court ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence
on both sides to proceed to trial on the existence of knowledge. 7'
On the one hand, HUD repeatedly warned Westchester County of
its obligation to analyze race and provided it with written guidance
as to how to meet its obligation. 72 On the other, HUD regularly
accepted Westchester County's impediments analysis that did not
analyze race, arguably leading the County to believe it was in compliance with the law.7 3 The government's knowledge of the falsity
of the claim did not necessarily bar FCA liability, but it was "relevant to the
issue of the County's knowledge or reckless
174
disregard.'

With the aid of the U.S. Department of Justice, the parties in
Anti-Discrimination Center ultimately reached a settlement, 75 leaving
unanswered the question as to whether Westchester County knowingly submitted false claims. However, the court's summary
judgment decision puts other municipalities on notice of their obligation to analyze and address race as an impediment to fair
housing. In an announcement of the Westchester County settlement, the U.S. Department of Justice underscored the "serious
commitment and responsibility to affirmatively further fair
170. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 668 F.Supp.2d at 554 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Fair Housing Planning Guide) (summary judgment opinion). The court also
noted that HUD had provided guidance through its communications with Westchester
County on its impediments analysis and explicitly advised Westchester County that the purpose of the impediments analysis was to "[a] nalyze and eliminate housing discrimination in
the jurisdiction" and to "[p]rovide opportunities for inclusive patterns of housing occupancy regardless of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability and national origin."
Id. at 554.
171. Id. at 567-68.
172. Id.
173. Id.at 568.
174. Id.
175. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Westchester County Agrees to Develop
Hundreds of Units of Fair and Affordable Housing in Settlement of Federal Lawsuit (Aug.
10, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/westchester pr.pdf.
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housing" that comes with accepting HUD funds, and the Department's intention to enforce these obligations. 176 As the effects of

the Anti-Discrimination Center legal findings begin to influence future cases and policymakers begin to enforce the AFFH
requirement, defendants will be less able to plead ignorance, making the FCA a more attractive tool for private enforcement of the
fair housing laws.
Despite the progress Anti-Discrimination Center achieved in the
enforcement of fair housing laws, it leaves open the policy question
of what steps a municipality must take to overcome the impediments to fair housing posed by racial segregation and
discrimination. The next section will examine "fair-share" and inclusionary zoning policy as two methods that municipalities should
adopt to meet their obligations in administering fair housing programs.
III.

LOCAL AND REGIONAL ZONING REFORMS THAT
AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR HOUSING

This section proposes certain measures-specifically regional
coordination and inclusionary zoning policies-that are likely to
achieve greater racial and economic integration in housing. To
give greater force to the AFFH requirement discussed in Section II,
Congress should make regional coordination and inclusionary zoning policies a precondition to receiving HUD funds. Although such
measures could be mandated by the courts, based on a progressive
interpretation of existing HUD regulations, states and municipalities would be better served by making these obligations clear in
new federal legislation. Inclusionary zoning has already been implemented by many states, but a federal mandate tied to HUD
funding would make integration a national priority with greater
uniformity and enforcement.
A. Mount Laurel and "FairShare" Housing Obligations
The argument proposed in Anti-DiscriminationCenter that recipients of HUD grants must take affirmative steps to overcome racial
segregation and discrimination is by no means novel. One of the
primary purposes of the FHA and the establishment of HUD was to
"remedy the 'weak intentions' that have led to the federal govern176. Id. at 3.
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ment's sanctioning discrimination in housing through this Nation."

77

In cases like NAACP v. Secretary of Housing and Urban

Development7 and Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development,'79 federal courts have held that Section 3608 of the
FHA reflects Congress' intent that HUD use its grant programs to
assist in ending discrimination and segregation"O and "do more
than simply refrain from discriminating.'.'. Since local governments actually put the HUD grants to work, the onus is passed to
them to implement these lofty goals, often with little guidance or
oversight from HUD.
One of the preconditions for states receiving HUD grants
should be the dismantling of exclusionary zoning practices and the
adoption of affirmative measures to produce affordable housing in
all local jurisdictions. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, the NewJersey Supreme Court established the
seminal legal doctrine on inclusionary zoning practices and regional responsibility for affordable housing."2 Although the Court
in Mount LaurelI chose to consider the case from the standpoint of
economic segregation, the case concerns racial segregation as well,
at least if one accepts that racial minorities are disproportionately
represented among the economically disadvantaged class.8 3
When the case began in 1974, Mount Laurel was a rapidly developing suburb of Camden, New Jersey.8 4 Because residents of
Mount Laurel wanted the community to develop into a low-density
suburb, the municipal government enacted zoning ordinances that
essentially restricted new residential development to single-family
detached dwellings with sizeable lots.' Although a few developments for rental units were approved under zoning variance
procedures, these projects were intentionally targeted toward middle class and wealthy individuals with few or no children. 6 The few
"pockets of poverty" that existed in Mount Laurel were "deteriorating or dilapidated," and would naturally be replaced by more
177. Michael Allen, Testimony, supra note 48, at 1.
178. 817 F.2d 149, 155 (lstCir. 1987).
179. 436 F.3d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970).
180. Michael Allen, Testimony, supra note 48, at 1.
181. Id. at 2 (quoting NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (lst
Cir. 1987)).
182. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d
713 (1975).
183. Id. at 717.
184. Id. at 718.
185. Id. at 719.
186. Id. at 722. The town specifically wanted to limit the number of families with children because adding more children without significantly increasing tax revenue would
increase education costs and eventually lead to higher property taxes. Id.
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expensive dwellings as development expanded. 187 Such zoning restrictions were pervasive in the fastest growing communities across
the state."'
The NAACP brought a claim on behalf of poor black and Hispanic residents who were effectively being excluded from new
housing in Mount Laurel developments. 9 The NAACP argued that
the ordinances violated plaintiff's due process and equal protection rights.' 9 Mount Laurel agreed that its zoning ordinances
excluded lower income individuals, but that the ordinances were
meant to protect low property taxes for existing residents. 9' The
court found that Mount Laurel could not "foreclose the opportunity" for the development of low- and moderate-income housing
under New Jersey's Constitution, and that it must "affirmatively afford [the] opportunity" to produce the municipality's "fair share of
the present and prospective regional need" for such housing.'9
In striking down Mount Laurel's zoning ordinances, the court
adopted a new interpretation of the underlying police powers from
which municipalities derive their zoning authority. Eight years after
Mount Laurel I, the court summarized the constitutional basis for
the decision in the follow-up case, Mount Laurel II'
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police
power and as such, must be exercised for the general welfare.
When the exercise of that power by a municipality affects
something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes more than the welfare of that municipality and its
citizens: it also includes the general welfare-in this case
housing needs-of those residing outside of the municipality
but within the region that contributes to the housing demand
within the municipality. Municipal land use regulations that

187. Id. at 718, 722.
188. Id. at 717.
189. Id.; see also Norman Williams & Anya Yates, The Background of Mount Laurel I, 20
VT. L. Rav. 687, 695-96 (1996). Although the NAACP's basis for its claim was racial discrimination, the court considered Mount Laurel's zoning ordinances from the broader
perspective of all low- and middle-income residents in New Jersey. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d
at 717.
190. See Williams & Yates, supra note 189, at 696.
191. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 730-31.
192. Id. at 732.
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conflict with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police
power and are unconstitutional.9
Mount Laurel I is best known for broadening the interpretation
of the General Welfare Clause to include regional housing needs
beyond the borders of the municipality defining the zoning ordinances. The court left it to the State legislature and the
municipalities to calculate their "fair-share" obligation for afford194
able housing and what measures to take to promote those ends.
However, after eight years of legal confusion in the lower courts'
results, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II explicitly
laid out some of the obligations municipalities had in making their
zoning practices more inclusionary and in promoting the development of affordable housing. 195 These practices can broadly be
described as regional coordination and inclusionary zoning.
B. Regional CoordinationMeasures
Traditionally, zoning policies are established through a comprehensive land use plan and then implemented at a local level.
Although a municipality's zoning decisions may have effects beyond its borders, planning usually only accounts for the "parochial
concerns of the zoning locality." 96 Several states including California, Florida, Oregon, and Washington have led the way in adopting
legislation that require localities to adopt comprehensive land use
plans that account for affordable housing needs. 197 Such regulations require municipalities to analyze housing needs in terms of
the "locality's existing and projected population, current housing
supply, and available buildable land." l99 Many of these states provide various levels of regulatory oversight of local implementation
of their land use plans and, at least in Oregon, the State may withhold certain grant funds if the municipality is not implementing its
zoning laws consistently with regional housing goals19 Though
these legislative efforts are laudable, they lack the regional

193. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I1), 456 A.2d
390,415 (1983).
194. Mount Laurel , 336 A.2d at 733-34.
195. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415.
196. Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning ForAll: Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques
to Promote Affordable Housing,44 EMORY L.J. 359, 372 (1995).
197. Id. at 372-73.
198. Id. at 373.
199. Id. at 373-74.
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coordination and strong enforcement mechanisms that are likely
to bring about real change.
In response to Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey State legislature
enacted the Municipal Land Use Law,2 which recognizes the role
of regional coordination in ensuring that individual municipalities
live up to their Mount Laurel obligations. 1 New Jersey's approach
went one step further than states like Oregon by passing the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act20 2 and creating the Council on Affordable

Housing that "supervise[s] the allocation of fair-share housing
burdens under the Act." 203 Under the Act, municipalities voluntarily submit themselves to review in exchange for protection from
lawsuits resulting from their potentially exclusionary zoning practices.0 4 The State coordinates localities by defining "growth areas"
through the State Development Guide Plan. 20 5 The Plan allocates

housing obligations based on remedial, current, and future regional needs, as well as by providing the time frame for
implementing

development

plans.2 0 6 Through

legislative

and

administrative means, New Jersey both ensures proper coordination of affordable housing needs and enforcement of each
municipality's "fair-share" obligations.
Regional coordination, much like the regulations implemented
in New Jersey, should be a mandatory precondition for a recipient
of HUD funding. Any meaningful analysis of impediments to racial
integration will find that parochial control of zoning measures effectively maintains our segregated towns. Before any municipality
can make a good faith effort toward affirmatively furthering fair
housing, it must understand the current and future regional needs
for housing in its relevant area, not just the needs of its current
constituents.
This shift away from parochialism in housing policy was the
spirit behind the Gautreux and Yonkers decisions. 207 Regional coor-

200.
201.
202.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-28(d) (West 2009).
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -307 (West 2008).

203.
204.

Ford, supranote 4, at 1852.
Jason McCann, Pushing Growth Share: Can Inclusionary Zoning Fix What is Broken with

NewJersey's Mount Laurel Doctrine?, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 191, 205 (2006).
205.

Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 418.

206. Id.
207. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111.1969). Gautreaux, in particular, used
the entire Chicago metropolitan area, including surrounding suburbs, in defining the geographic scope of the court's remedy. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976). In
Anti-DiscriminationCenter, the plaintiff alleged that Westchester's failure to look beyond the
housing needs of its existing residents is a failure in its impediments analysis. Complaint
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dination and enforcement is particularly important when it comes
to fighting racial segregation because of the phenomenon of
"white flight," where fear of the changing racial makeup of a community causes white residents to flee to neighboring all-white
communities. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this danger in Mount Laurel IIwhen it emphasized the "fair-share" remedy:
No one community need be concerned that it will be radically
transformed by a deluge of low and moderate income developments. Nor should any community conclude that its
residents will move to other suburbs as a result of this decision, for those 'other suburbs' may very well be required to do
their part to provide the same housing. °8
Drastic changes in existing property values and a mass exodus of
current residents are legitimate concerns that illustrate the need
for regional coordination in implementing housing policy. That is
why Congress should mandate that municipalities engage in regional coordination as a precondition to receiving HUD funds.
Regional coordination in zoning will ameliorate the fears that exacerbate white flight by ensuring that no single community serves
as an exclusive haven for wealth and privilege while another becomes a concentrated center of poverty. Regional coordination in
zoning decisions is not only fair, but it is the only effective way to
meaningfully and permanently address racial segregation.
C. Inclusionary Zoning
In some cases, simply relaxing zoning restrictions will attract developers to build a more diverse range of housing options in a
community that had been exclusively zoned for single-family dwellings. In other cases, however, incentives may be necessary to
promote the development of affordable housing in communities
where it does not traditionally exist. All municipalities that face
substantial economic and racial segregation should implement inclusionary zoning policies. The federal government in particular
should mandate inclusionary zoning in municipalities that receive
federal funds through HUD, as was the case in the CDBG program
in dispute in Anti-DiscriminationCenter

1

48-52, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester County, 495 F. Supp.
2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Civ. 2860), 2006 WL 6348390.
208.

Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d at 420-21.
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"Inclusionary zoning" is the label given to a range of development tools used by municipalities to promote the development of
low- and moderate-income housing. °9 Typically, inclusionary zoning either mandates or encourages developers to provide "some
minimum percentage (often 10-20 percent)" of low- to moderateincome housing in new residential projects. 210 Municipalities often
provide incentives to developers including density bonuses,211 reduced development standards, expedited processing, fee deferrals,
or loans and grants. Often municipalities will simply mandate
that a certain portion of the development be set aside for affordable housing, or require the developer to pay a fee to fund
affordable housing programs.213 Affordable housing fees may also
be imposed on non-residential developers, such as factories or offices, that might increase the need for low-income
housing due to
21 4
low-income jobs that the business attracts.
Inclusionary zoning programs have caught on in recent years
and can be found in states across the nation including California,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.2 5 Inclusionary zoning measures are attractive in that they cost little or
nothing to implement and have some success in actually producing
affordable housing. For example, five years after the implementation of the Council on Affordable Housing in New Jersey, which
mandated the use of several methods of inclusionary zoning,
22,703 additional units of affordable housing were built in the
state .216

One of the criticisms of inclusionary zoning is that it makes the
availability of housing more remote for everyone "by raising prices
for market-rate buyers and discouraging builders."217 Discouraging
builders from building market-rate housing ultimately decreases
209. Morgan, supra note 196, at 369-84 (detailing the various techniques that have been
used to promote affordable housing development). See also Andrew Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionaiy Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 45-46
(1996) (listing three regimes that fall under the rubric of inclusionary zoning).
210. Cecily T. Talbert, Nadia L. Costa & Kiran C. Jain, American BarAssociation Section of
State and Local Government Law 2007 Report of the Inclusionary Zoning Subcommittee of the Land
Use Committee CurrentIssues in InclusionaryZoning, SNO05 A.L.I.-A.BA 1537, 1539 (2007).
211. A density bonus allows a developer to build more housing units than authorized by
zoning regulations without acquiring more land. Id. at 1545.
212. Id. at 1539, 1545.
213. Id. at 1540.
214. Morgan, supra note 196, at 381-82.
215. Talbert, Costa &Jain, supra note 210, at 1539.
216. Morgan, supra note 196, at 369.
217. J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 560 (2007).
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the supply of affordable housing, which is tied by inclusionary zoning to new market-rate development.21s In addition, the
comparatively high cost of building low-income housing on expensive land in affluent communities can be viewed as a lost
opportunity to build a greater quantity of affordable housing elsewhere.219 Certain states' lawmakers have felt the need to balance
the competing interests of providing economically integrated housing and increasing the aggregate quantity of affordable housing.
For example, New Jersey tempered its Mount Laurel mandates by
allowing "municipalities to transfer up to fifty percent of their affordable housing obligations to other municipalities." 2 ° This
controversial provision "shifted the rationale of the Mount Laurel
doctrine from the broad goal of ending geographic segregation
surrounding inner-city minorities and toward the raw provision of
low-income housing., 221 In one instance, "four affluent towns paid
New Brunswick[, New Jersey] $7.65 million to accept their obliga222
tion to provide 406 units" of affordable housing.
Some municipalities have sought to limit the exchange provision's effect on the goal of integrating housing. For example, in
Montgomery County, Maryland, faced with a similar provision that
allows municipalities to exchange affordable housing obligations,
the County requires officials to first find that "the public benefit of
additional affordable housing outweighs the value of locating
MPDUs [Moderately Priced Dwelling Units] in each subdivision
throughout the County" before authorizing an exchange.2 Finding the right balance between the dual fair housing goals of
integrating and increasing the supply of affordable housing is a
policy decision that must be made in light of the economic and
political realities of a particular municipality.
Relaxing zoning restrictions is the first step toward racial and
economic integration in affluent communities, but it alone is not
enough to achieve those goals. Inclusionary zoning measures such
as those mandated in Mount Laurel II are the types of affirmative
measures envisioned in the statutes and regulations that established HUD,224 and should be a mandatory precondition to
receiving HUD grants. Given the discriminatory nature of
218. Id. But see Dietderich, supra note 209, at 84-102 (explaining how in a market with
inelastic demand and where the developer can price-discriminate among purchasers, the
developer can still make a profit and the supply of affordable housing will still increase).
219. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 217, at 561.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 562.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2) (2006).
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traditional zoning policies and the widespread usage of inclusionary zoning to combat economic and racial segregation, a
progressive interpretation of the requirement that HUD grantees
"affirmatively further fair housing" should put municipalities on
notice that they are required adopt such measures. Policymakers
should not wait for the courts to mandate such measures, however,
but should realize that it is in the collective interest of the state to
produce integrated affordable housing options.
One law professor, Charles Daye, has proposed a federal statute
that would explicitly mandate inclusionary zoning for any locality
that receives any sort of federal funding.2 5 In the spirit of the Gautreaux and Mount Laurel decisions, the proposed statute defines a
municipality's affordable housing obligations in terms of regional
housing needs. 6 It both prohibits the practice of exclusionary zon22 7
ing as well as mandates "inclusionary policies and practices.
Such a statute would make explicit what HUD regulations already
imply in "affirmatively further[ing] fair housing."2 28 Citizen and
government suits under the FCA, as illustrated in AntiDiscriminationCenter, ensure that such a statute would be enforced
and that meaningful results could be achieved. Although extending such mandates beyond the scope of federal housing grants-as
Professor Daye envisions-might meet constitutional challenges
under the Spending or Commerce Clauses,
such mandates
should be a necessary part of any comprehensive affordable housing program.
D. Criticisms of Inclusionary Zoning
The classic economic critique of inclusionary zoning is found in
Robert Ellickson's article entitled "The Irony of 'Inclusionary' Zoning. '2, - Ellickson argues that there are inefficiencies inherent in
inclusionary zoning policies and that the policies end up hurting

225. Charles E. Daye, Commentary, Toward "OneAmerica": A Proposed FederalStatute Prohibiting Exclusionary Land-Use Practices and Mandating Indusionary Policies, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., May 2001, at 3-4.
226. See id. at 5.
227. Id. at 5.
228. See supra Part II.C.2.
229. Daye, supra note 225, at 4.
230. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary"Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167
(1981). Sixteen years after Ellickson's influential critique was first published, Andrew Dietderich offered a response using updated economic theories in support of inclusionary
zoning. Dietderich, supranote 209.
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the very people they intend to help. 3 ' First, because inclusionary
zoning acts as a tax on developers, developers bear this cost either
by losing profits, passing the cost onto consumers through increased market-rate housing prices, or by ceasing to build
232
altogether, thus further aggravating the affordable housing crisis.
However, Ellickson mischaracterizes inclusionary zoning as a tax by
failing to distinguish mandatory set-asides that are not offset by
cost-saving density bonuses and other incentives from voluntary
policies that empower developers to bypass certain exclusionary
zoning requirements. 2 Far from being a tax, in most cases developers actively seek inclusionary zoning to build a more profitable
and diverse stock of housing.
Second, Ellickson argues that exclusionary zoning policies are
inherently efficient since they are a manifestation of the net social
preferences of consumers. 25 Housing developers seek to maximize
their profits by building housing patterns demanded by their customers. 36 If those customers valued economic and racial
integration more than stratification, then they would pay more for
integrated housing patterns and developers would build in conformity with consumer preferences. Ellickson argues that "the fact
that market forces tend to produce economically stratified
neighborhoods creates a prima facie case that this stratification is
it assumes that
efficient. "237 Ellickson's argument is flawed because
S 238

market forces in housing are freely exercised . Although some
zoning measures can be efficient, zoning typically promotes cartel behavior among existing homeowners,2 ° acts as a subsidy for
single-family homes by giving such development exclusive rights to
land,24 1 and unfairly pushes negative externalities onto those outside the boundaries of the municipality.242 Even when inclusionary
zoning is mandated on developers, it does not necessarily lead to

231. Ellickson, supra note 230, at 1215.
232. Id. at 1187-88.
233. See Dietderich, supranote 209, at 40-41.
234. Id. at 40.
235. Ellickson, supra note 230, at 1200.
236. Id.
237. Id. Efficiency, in this case, means that, assuming hypothetically that property is sold
in a perfectly free market, a rich person will pay more for the right to live in a neighborhood
of rich people than a poor person will pay to live in the same neighborhood; the property is
allocated to the person who values it most. Id.
238. Dietderich, supra note 209, at 31.
239. Id. at 33-34.
240. Id. at 35.
241. Id. at 31-32.
242. Id. at 34.
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developer losses, especially when coupled with valuable incentives
for developers. 4 '
Third, Ellickson argues that in the long-run, the perceived benefits to the poor-namely an increased stock of affordable
housing-are at least partially off-set by the loss in filtering.144 Filtering is the process by which expensive homes eventually trickle
down to low-income buyers through depreciation and new housing
construction.245 The filtering theory is criticized in part because it is
based on the assumption that the housing market is unitary (i.e., it
does not distinguish between a market for apartments and a market for single-family homes) and ignores the economic costs of
converting mansions into multiple homes for low-income residents. 2 46 Housing policies based on a filter theory have been
blamed for "abandonment, gentrification, the concentration
of
247
poverty, and the perpetuation of racial segregation."
Some of the criticisms of inclusionary zoning by Ellickson and
others, especially regarding how such policies have been implemented today, are more persuasive. For example, voluntary
inclusionary zoning that is left to developers to implement, as is
the predominant practice in California, has resulted in the construction of housing for mostly middle-income groups, leaving
those most in need no better off.24 8 In this sense, New Jersey has
been more successful than California by using mandatory
quotas to
S•
249
target the program to those it is intended to help. In both New
Jersey and California, the preference for selling below-market
priced units, rather than renting, negates some of the long-term
benefits of inclusionary zoning, as beneficiaries can simply turn
around and sell their property at the market rate and thus deplete
the new stock of affordable housing.250
More crucial to the thesis of this Note, inclusionary zoning has
also largely failed to integrate racial minorities and urban populations into wealthier communities. 521 Although inclusionary units
typically go to those who legitimately need affordable housing, they
243. Id. at 68-69.
244. Ellickson, supra note 230, at 1186-87.
245. Id. at 1184-85.
246. Dietderich, supra note 209, at 43.
247. Id.
248. Nico Calavita, Kenneth Grimes & Alan Mallach, Inclusionary Housing in California
and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 109, 125 (1997) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.knowledgeplex.org/progra-s/hpd/pdf/hpd-0801calavita.pdf.
249. Id. at 125.
250. Id. at 127.
251. Id. at 129.
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have overwhelmingly served those from the suburban communities
where they are built.25' These include "blue-collar workers, needy

young couples, and divorced mothers with small children, many of
whom had been doubling up with their more affluent suburban
parents. '' 1 53 Although inclusionary zoning creates the opportunity

for further integration, these programs have to be coupled with
marketing and other informational campaigns to reach out across
the region to minorities and urban residents who might benefit
from such programs. 2-55 Like all new public benefit programs, the
targeted groups must be informed about the program before they
can take advantage of it.
The lessons gained from the history of inclusionary zoning in
various jurisdictions and in modern economic analysis reveal that
inclusionary zoning policies must be developed with the specific
characteristics of the locality in mind and with clear policy objectives. A system must be developed that emphasizes the importance
of racial and economic integration as well as ensures that the
measures are both effective and sustainable.

CONCLUSION

This Note presents a new approach to promoting racial and
economic integration in housing. Anti-Discrimination Center v. Westchester County provides a blueprint for an effective enforcement
mechanism of civil rights and fair housing laws at the local level. By
defining the municipal obligation to analyze and address
impediments to fair housing posed by race, the federal court in
Anti-DiscriminationCenter signaled to the over 1,200 municipalities
across the country that receive CDBG funding that they must finally take seriously their obligation to encourage a truly integrated
pattern of housing. The court also legitimized the use of the FCA
by a private citizen or non-profit organization to sue a municipality
on behalf of the federal government when the municipality accepts
HUD funding but shirks the attached obligations. A citizen enforcement action ensures that true integration policy will not be
hampered by an administration that lacks the political will to enforce the original intent of the fair housing laws.
The enforcement mechanism illustrated in Anti-Discrimination
Center is but one important piece to providing an effective
252.
253.

Id.
Id.

254.

See id.at 128.
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integration policy. State and local governments must take a close
look at how their zoning policies contribute to the perpetuation of
racially and economically segregated housing patterns. Regional
coordination in the shape of fair-share housing obligations and
inclusionary zoning programs are essential to providing the opportunity for truly integrated housing. Although a progressive
interpretation of existing legislation might already mandate the
need for inclusionary zoning, federal legislation, such as the statute
suggested by Professor Daye, would provide greater guidance and
uniformity to local municipalities, resulting in a more effective integration policy. Ultimately, true integration will depend on the
preferences of existing and potential residents of affluent communities, but by providing the proper incentives and opportunities,
inclusionary zoning and fair-share legislation can go a long way in
fulfilling the promise of the Fair Housing Act passed nearly forty
years ago.

